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Implication of the No Child Left Behind Act for 
Educational Equity and Segregation  
L. Darnell Weeden* 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue to be addressed is whether the No Child Left Behind Act 
(“NCLBA”) is a proper tool for advancing equity in education.  Provisions 
of the NCLBA that require states to adhere to educational accountability 
have been construed as being seriously underfunded.1  These provisions 
have been argued as underfunded in not providing the states with adequate 
federal funding to compensate for the state’s compliance with the Act’s 
provisions.2  The prerequisites of NCLBA have also been viewed as con-
flicting with established desegregation orders in public schools.3  However, 
some parents of public school students see NCLBA as an effective method 
of providing their children with better educational opportunities.4  There are 
many good reasons for opposing the NCLBA accountability provisions and 
developing the position that NCLBA accountability provisions are in viola-
tion of the Spending Clause.5  Laws that require public schools to expend 
more economic resources than they can reasonably afford should be consid-
ered unconstitutional.6  
This paper will include a brief discussion in Part I of the historical de-
velopment of federal aid for public elementary and secondary education.  
Part II addresses the Spending Clause.  Part III presents an evaluation of 
State of Connecticut v. Spellings.  Part IV gives an analysis of the NCLBA 
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accountability requirements.  Part V reviews the 2007 Congressional debate 
about the NCLBA.  Part VI explores the impact of the NCLBA on school 
integration.  
I. A HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Since the 1960s, the United States has funded public school education 
through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”).7 The 
ESEA authorizes the disbursement of federal aid to school districts and 
school systems.8  In 1965, the Act came out of the efforts of President John-
son to combat poverty and Congress’ quest to provide “educational rights 
that apply to all students.”9  Decades later in the 1980s, the government, 
under President Reagan, published A Nation at Risk, which reported on the 
weak reading skills of the nation’s students and insisted on the need to re-
verse mediocre education in the nation.10  The focus of education through-
out the country then began to shift to higher standards and achievement.11   
In 1994, President Clinton reauthorized the ESEA and set the stage for 
the accountability provisions that the NCLBA would later adopt.12  In 1994, 
Congress passed Goals 2000: Educate America Act (“Goals 2000”), which 
provided federal funds to states for the development of state standards and 
assessment systems.13   As a compliment to Goals 2000, President Clinton 
authorized the Improving America's Schools Act (“IASA”).14  IASA “re-
quired that states assess all students at certain grade levels.”15  Together 
these two laws were “aimed at providing states with the capacities and in-
centives to engage in standards-based reforms.”16  Due to problems with the 
implementation of these laws, they were abandoned and never reautho-
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rized.17   A few years later, President George W. Bush signed into law the 
NCLBA, to achieve equal academic standards throughout the nation.18  
II. SPENDING CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
The Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he 
Congress shall have Power . . . to provide for . . . the general Welfare of the 
United States.”19   Commentator Gina Austin believes that the federal gov-
ernment’s regulation of the state’s authority to maintain educational pro-
gramming violates the Spending Clause by requiring states to follow na-
tional guidelines in order to receive financial support for schools.20  The 
Supreme Court identified four requirements in South Dakota v. Dole that 
allow for federal funding without the Spending Clause.21  The funding must 
be exercised to promote the general welfare of the United States.22  The 
condition for funding cannot be ambiguous.23  The money should have a 
relationship to a federal concern.24  Lastly, the conditional funding must not 
conflict with another constitutional provision.25  
The four Spending Clause restrictions were designed to prohibit Con-
gress from using federal funds to place an undue regulatory burden on the 
states.26  Most of the cases involving accusations of Spending Clause viola-
tions have resulted in federal courts upholding Congress’ conditional spend-
ing legislation.27   
III. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. SPELLINGS 
A.  Arguments Against Compliance with Accountability Standards:         
Emphasis on State of Connecticut v. Spellings 
In State of Connecticut v. Spellings,28 the State challenged the U.S. 
Secretary of the Department of Education’s (“DOE”) interpretation of sev-
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eral key elements of the NCLBA. The State alleged that the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the “Unfunded Mandates Provision” of the NCLBA is con-
trary to its plain language and Congress’ intent in enacting it.29  
In Count I of its complaint, the State sought a declaratory judgment 
that would compel the Secretary to clarify the meaning of the Unfunded 
Mandate Provision of the NCLBA.30   The State alleged that the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the NCLBA violates the Spending Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment in Count II of the complaint.31  Count III of the complaint chal-
lenged the Secretary’s denial of waivers and alleged failure to comply with 
statutory requirements.32  In Count IV, the State alleged a violation of the 
federal Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).33  
Under Count I, involving the declaratory judgment claim, the parties 
challenged the Secretary’s interpretation of the following three provisions 
of the NCLBA: (1) the requirement that special education assessments be 
conducted at grade level rather than instructional level; (2) the requirement 
that English-language-learning students receive mathematics assessments in 
their first year in the country and reading assessments in the following year; 
and (3) the requirement that non-formative annual testing occur in every 
grade.34  Although the Court held that the State of Connecticut had standing 
to bring the action, the Court determined it did not have subject-matter ju-
risdiction to hear the case because the Secretary had not yet taken steps to 
enforce her interpretation of the NCLBA.35  
1.  Declaratory Judgment 
The Secretary raised a number of objections to the State’s claims in 
Count I (declaratory judgment claim).  When deciding on a standing objec-
tion, the Court must presume the fact alleged, accept the truth of the plain-
tiff’s allegations of jurisdiction, and construe all inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff.36  The Court found that the State met the requirement of standing 
because the State alleged that by denying the State’s waiver requests, the 
Secretary was requiring the State to expend substantial sums in excess of 
federal funding to comply with the NCLBA provisions.37  The Court rea-
soned that if the current funding is inadequate, a declaratory judgment pro-
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hibiting the Secretary from requiring the State to expend more financial 
resources to comply with the NCLBA provisions would remedy the State's 
alleged injury.38  
Although the Court found that the State had standing, the Court ac-
knowledged that allowing the State to challenge the Secretary’s interpreta-
tion of the NCLBA prior to any agency action against the State would un-
dermine the comprehensive system for enforcement provided by Con-
gress.39  The General Education Provisions Act (“GEPA”) provides the Sec-
retary with a variety of mechanisms for enforcing the terms of NCLBA.40  
GEPA contains a comprehensive enforcement scheme that requires notice to 
the agency’s Secretary and a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, 
which is subject to a discretionary review by the Secretary.41  After a final 
agency action, the complaint may be appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals.42  The Court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter 
until after concrete positions have been taken at the administrative level and 
a full administrative record has been developed; thus, formal and final 
agency action must have been taken prior to seeking judicial recourse.43   
When deciding on prudential ripeness, a court evaluates both the fit-
ness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court considerations.44  The Court considered that fitness en-
tailed statutory construction and was fit for judicial review, but desired a 
further development of the record.45  The court found that because the State 
was in compliance with the NCLBA, the State was not in danger of immi-
nent enforcement and thus not subject to any hardship.46  The Court stated 
that it would rather have a final action by an administrative agency before 
making a decision on the matter.47  The Court reasoned that the issue should 
be taken up with the DOE.48  The Court reasoned that in order for it to de-
cide the matter at hand, both parties were required to take the issue up at the 
federal administrative level.49  
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2.  Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment Claims 
The State’s Spending Clause claim (Count II) focuses on the State’s 
reasons for accepting federal funding under NCLBA.50  Under the Spending 
Clause, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds pro-
vided to states, as long as the exercise of the spending power is in pursuit of 
the general welfare and the conditions on funding are laid out unambigu-
ously.51  The State understood that the federal government would pay for all 
of the costs that were associated with complying with the NCLBA.52  The 
State claimed that the Secretary changed that condition as the State initially 
understood it to be.53  
The State’s Tenth Amendment claim (also Count II) concerns the no-
tion that the Secretary has the authority to withhold all Title I funding if the 
State does not comply with the NCLBA’s testing requirements.54  This claim 
focuses on the penalties that the State would face, if the Secretary should 
find that the State was not in compliance with the NCLBA.55  The State 
alleged that the penalties for noncompliance, which would include the 
DOE’s withholding of Title I funds and other school-related funding, would 
be harsh and unrelated to the State’s initial acceptance of the federal fund-
ing.56  Similar to the State’s declaratory judgment claim in Count I, the 
Court found that Count II allegations of Spending Clause and Tenth 
Amendment violations sought pre-enforcement declaratory rulings. 57  The 
Court explained that such a decision on Count II would be directly tied to 
the Secretary’s interpretation of the NCLBA.58  The Court determined that 
in order to decide on the Spending Clause claim, the Court would have to 
analyze the Secretary’s interpretation of the NCLBA.59  The Court cited the 
State’s compliance as a reason why the Secretary has not yet withheld fund-
ing.60  The Court concluded that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction 
to hear the Count II claim.61       
The State’s denial of waivers and abdication of statutory responsibility 
claim (Count III) focuses on whether the Secretary’s denial of the waivers 
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was arbitrary and capricious and whether the Secretary meaningfully con-
sidered the state waivers.62  The Court found that Congress did not grant the 
Court any authority to consider a matter that is committed to the agency’s 
discretion.63  Although the State alleged in its abdication of statutory re-
sponsibility claim that the Secretary flatly refused to consider waiver re-
quests concerning a testing method, the Court found that there was proof of 
the Secretary’s reasons for refusing the State’s requests, including the fact 
that the State and Secretary had a number of discussions about the matter.64   
The State claimed in Count IV that the Secretary arbitrarily and capri-
ciously denied the State’s request for plan amendments and violated the 
APA in failing to provide an adequate hearing prior to rejecting the State’s 
plan amendments.65 The Court found that a detailed analysis of the plan 
amendments and an administrative record would better enable the Court to 
make a decision on the denial of the State’s request for plan amendments.66  
The Court refused to dismiss the APA violation claim by the state because it 
believed that a detailed administrative record would be helpful to the 
Court.67  The Court believed that if the Secretary did violate the APA, the 
appropriate solution would be to remand the hearing of the plan amendment 
to the DOE.68  The State, however, stated in portions of its complaint and 
brief that it wanted the court, and not the DOE, to rule on the matter.69  
Therefore, the Court found that the second part of the count, in which the 
State alleged that the Secretary violated the APA in failing to provide an 
adequate hearing prior to rejecting the State’s plan amendments, was 
moot.70  The Court found the APA violation count moot because the State 
did not seek to remand the issue for a hearing, but rather wanted the Court 
to decide the merits of the plan amendments.71   
The State was able to continue with its claim that the Secretary’s de-
nial of the State’s requests for NCLBA plan amendments was arbitrary and 
capricious in nature and in violation of the APA.72  On appeal, the State mo-
tioned for entry of judgment on the dismissed Counts I (declaratory judg-
ment) and II (Spending Clause and 10th Amendment), under Rule 54(b), 
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which provides that where the district court has dismissed some, but not all 
claims in an action, certifying its judgment as final under Rule 54(b) is gen-
erally not appropriate if the same or closely related issues remain to be liti-
gated.73  The Appeals Court denied the Rule 54(b) motion and held that 
because legal questions raised by Counts I (declaratory judgment) and II 
(Spending Clause and 10th Amendment) were inextricably intertwined, they 
were not appropriate for an entry of judgment under Rule 54(b).74   
The legal battles are shaping up.  I believe that the litigation landscape 
involving NCLBA is challenging.  As indicated in Connecticut v. Spellings, 
one can anticipate a battle over jurisdiction about who has the power to hear 
disputes between the state and the DOE.  These disputes clearly raise issues 
of accountability requested by the federal government and the state’s reluc-
tance to comply with federal requests because it believes that the federal 
government has issued an unfunded mandate.  The Connecticut v. Spellings 
Court clearly indicated that it would rather not enter the NCLBA litigation 
thicket without the benefit of prior agency proceedings.  When it comes to 
educational policies, I think it is fair to conclude that the battle for control 
over education policy has only just begun.  I anticipate, in the absence of 
strong congressional intervention, that NCLBA litigation will be a persis-
tent pattern for years to come.   
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE NCLBA ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS    
A.  Arguments Against Compliance with Accountability Standards:        
Emphasis on Commentary 
Professor Danielle Holley-Walker has noted that there are two impor-
tant issues that are involved in the debate of the burdens that NCLBA im-
poses on states.75  One is the federal government’s failure to provide suffi-
cient financial resources for the statutory requirements.76  Holley-Walker 
cited School District of Pontiac v. Spellings, in which the state of Connecti-
cut sued the DOE, alleging that the federal government’s requirement that 
states use more money to pay for student testing than what the federal gov-
ernment provides is unlawful.77  Another burden is the notion that NCLBA 
imposes regulation that has traditionally been the responsibility of the 
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states.78  Holley-Walker stated that before NCLBA was enacted, every state 
in the nation already had student testing systems in place.79 Professor Hol-
ley-Walker also provided information suggesting that some states have to 
expend their resources to pay for both state and federally mandated ac-
countability standards.80   
Benjamin Michael Superfine has cited the failure to provide states, dis-
tricts, and schools with the needed capacities, such as financial resources, to 
comply with NCLBA mandates as one of the major problems plaguing the 
implementation of NCLBA.81  States and state-level entities claim to have 
only a limited ability to implement NCLBA testing and accountability pro-
visions effectively.82  The courts have not constituted an effective venue for 
addressing these problems.83  
Superfine believes that the NCLBA Adequacy Approach would allow 
courts to examine NCLBA implementation problems in terms of educa-
tional adequacy.84  The Adequacy Approach would allow courts to examine 
the NCLBA’s implementation problems directly through the lens of educa-
tional adequacy.85  This will allow courts that use the approach to interpret 
the NCLBA accountability mandates as necessary for a state to fulfill its 
duties under the law.86  Courts would construe the effective implementation 
of NCLBA mandates regarding standards and accountability as necessary 
for a state to fulfill its constitutional burden under the relevant education 
clause.87  The courts would use state standards to define education adequacy 
in the state.88  However, Superfine believes that the NCLBA Adequacy Ap-
proach would be problematic for states because courts would only consider 
the duty of a state under its constitution in solving the NCLBA’s funding 
problems.89  The approach would not require the federal government to pro-
vide the states with additional funding to implement the NCLBA’s provi-
sions, but instead would leave the states with less financial resources for 
other areas of state funding such as health and housing.90    
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B. Strain of NCLBA Meeting Accountability Requirements 
A number of states have public schools that are failing to reach the 
goals of achievement set by the NCLBA.91  The NCLBA is in its fifth year, 
which has been prescribed as the year in which penalties for non-
achievement will be more severe.92  The severe penalties include firing 
teachers and principals, shutting down schools, or a major change in the 
leadership of the school.93    
However, many educational experts have stated that failing schools 
have not actually been penalized as prescribed under the law.94  The schools 
have been labeled as failing, but there has not been any action taken as a 
result.95  A federal survey reveals that failing schools have been able to 
avoid changes in leadership.96   As a result of the lack of serious penalties 
handed down, parents are upset about the lack of action being taken as re-
quired under the law.97  
One superintendent in Los Angeles stated that she would like to shut 
down low-performing schools but it would be hard to do considering that 
more than half of the schools in her district do not meet the NCLBA stan-
dards.98  The NCLBA also would not allow removal of some teachers under 
the penalties provision because the NCLBA does not prevail over teacher 
union contracts that were in place before the law was enacted.99  Under un-
ion contract provisions of the United Teachers of Los Angeles, teachers are 
not allowed to examine their own student’s scores if it would result in the 
teachers being evaluated based on the scores. 100  One teacher at a school 
where teachers are not allowed to examine their own students’ scores be-
lieves that students suffer as a result of the teachers not being evaluated.101  
A parent at that same school believes that teachers should teach a curricu-
lum based on what the standardized tests will cover.102   
                                                                                                                           
 
91
 See Diana Jean Schemo, Failing Schools Strain to Meet U.S. Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2007, at A21. 
 
92
 Id.       
 
93
 Id.       
 
94
 Id.       
 
95
 Id.       
 
96
 Id.       
 
97
 Schemo, supra note 91. 
 
98
 See id.       
 
99
 See id.       
 
100
 See id.       
 
101
 Id.       
 
102
 Id.       
2008] Implication of the No Child Left Behind Act 111 
 
V.  THE 2007 CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ABOUT THE NCLBA 
The newest draft House Bill to renew the NCLBA has been criticized 
by civil rights groups and teachers unions.103 When the House Education 
Committee held its hearing in mid-September, the groups that voiced their 
criticisms included the Center for American Progress and Achieve Inc., the 
National Urban League, and the Citizens’ Commission on Civil Rights.104  
These groups all oppose a proposal that would allow school districts to cre-
ate their own measure of student progress rather than use statewide tests.105  
The groups claim that the intent of NCLBA to teach children of all races 
and income levels would be defeated.106  The new proposals in a House 
draft bill for NCLBA would no longer rely solely on math and reading test 
scores in determining the progress of a school.107   The new proposals would 
allow schools to show their academic strength by including test results in 
other subjects and other factors such as attendance, promotion, performance 
in advanced placement courses, and graduation rates.108  There is also a pro-
posed draft that would allow schools to test non-English speakers in their 
native language for up to five years, rather than the current three.109   
The proposal in the draft that would allow schools to test non-English 
speakers in their native language for up to five years, rather than the current 
three, has been criticized by DOE Secretary Margaret Spellings.110  Spell-
ings contended that the law would weaken the NCLBA’s effort to raise 
achievement level for poor and minority students.111  Spellings also com-
plained that the proposals would defeat the NCLBA’s accountability ef-
forts.112  Spellings particularly cited the testing of non-English speakers, 
saying that the law would allow such immigrant students to get as high as 
the 10th grade before they are ever tested in English.113     
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VI.  IMPACT OF NCLBA ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION/SEGREGATION ISSUES  
Holley-Walker also has suggested that some schools exclude minority 
students from the annual reports of student progress.114  These schools re-
quest that they be exempt from NCLBA provisions that require a large 
number of minority students to be included in assessment results.115  This 
action results in incentives to maintain a low percentage of minority stu-
dents in those schools.116  Holley-Walker disagreed with the argument that 
NCLBA fosters integration efforts through the NCLBA’s provision that 
allows student to transfer out of low-performing schools and into academi-
cally superior schools.117  
If the academically superior schools are predominantly white, then the 
transfer option, when exercised by a minority, creates a more racially di-
verse student body at the predominantly white school.118  When a high-
performing student leaves the low-performing school, the low-performing 
school suffers a loss both in intellectual achievement and intellectual diver-
sity.  When better performing students abandon low-performing schools, the 
low-performing school’s risk of intellectual deficiency is expanded.  A 
proper role for public officials under NCLBA is to provide incentives for 
low-performing schools to become competitive in the field of education 
without encouraging bright students to abandon them. However, data shows 
that few students are exercising the transfer option.119  Contrary to the inte-
gration suggestion, Holley-Walker asserted that NCLBA may in fact cause a 
reversal of the desegregation efforts of the past 40 years.120  Professor Hol-
ley-Walker suggested that desegregation plans in some parts of the country 
will be undermined by the mix that can occur by implementing the NCLBA 
provisions.121  The DOE requires that some schools districts follow NCLBA 
provisions in spite of possible conflicts with established desegregation 
plans and also advised school districts to ignore established desegregation 
plans.122   
One commentator, Anita Hill, has suggested that forcing the integra-
tion of poor and minority students into more economically advantaged 
schools will increase the race and class problems that already exist.123   Hill 
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also acknowledged that the provision of the NCLBA that allows students 
who attend non-performing schools to transfer to other public schools 
within the same school district will conflict with established desegregation 
orders.124  It is Professor Hill’s position that school districts in both the 
South and the North will have their school desegregation efforts negatively 
impacted because of the NCLBA.125  Furthermore, some black parents in 
the South have actually turned to the NCLBA to prevent schools from be-
coming once again segregated by race.  After white parents in Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama, objected to overcrowded schools, school officials approved a 
sweeping rezoning plan.126  Under the rezoning plan, a large majority of the 
hundreds of students commanded to rearrange their school plans during the 
fall of 2007 were black—and several were dispatched to virtually all-black, 
low-performing schools.127  Black parents have challenged the Tuscaloosa 
rezoning plan because they believe school officials are implementing the 
plan in order to resegregate the schools.128  In a new change of legal direc-
tion for an integration fight, Black parents in Tuscaloosa have asserted that 
the rezoning plan violates the spirit of the federal NCLBA.129  The NCLBA 
provides students in failing schools the right to enroll in a better performing 
school.130   Tuscaloosa is the city in which Governor George Wallace came 
to campus to prevent blacks from entering the University of Alabama as 
students.131  As Sam Dillon observed: “Three decades of federal desegrega-
tion marked by busing and white flight ended in 2000.  Though the city is 
54 percent white, its school system is 75 percent black.”132  Civil rights 
lawyers maintain that Tuscaloosa’s rezoning battle is somewhat novel be-
cause the NCLBA has become a primary issue.133  School districts are con-
fronting “uncharted territory over whether a reassignment plan can trump 
the law’s prohibition on moving students into low-performing schools.”134  
Even if the NCLBA may be used to help parents challenge a rezoning plan 
influenced by race in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, Professor Charles R. Lawrence, 
III, an ardent critic of NCLBA, has argued that the NCLBA is an ill-
conceived law implemented to ignore the root causes of racial segregation 
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in public schools.135  In his view, the NCLBA affirmatively hurts public 
policy in education by redirecting public attention and resources away from 
addressing the inequities of race and class while perpetuating, as well as 
reinforcing, social and racist practices that keep on preventing poor, work-
ing-class black and brown children from have equal access to educational 
opportunity.136   
The NCLBA maximum injury is inflicted by ignoring the race and 
class history that created the conditions that have caused the educational 
achievement gap that it pretends to close.137  As Lawrence observed: “The 
[NCLBA] speaks often of race, requiring schools to keep separate data by 
ethnicity and holding schools accountable for improving the test scores of 
non-white students. But nowhere does it speak of ending racism or disman-
tling segregation.”138  Supporters of NCLBA condemn the disproportionate 
harm that American schools impose upon poor black and brown children, 
but these defenders of NCLBA do not acknowledge any societal or gov-
ernmental responsibility for that harm.139  In order to have moral credibility, 
Professor Lawrence contends that advocates of NCLBA must acknowledge 
the educational harm suffered by historically underrepresented groups in the 
political process originated in America’s profound and entrenched separa-
tion involving white and black, rich and poor.140  Said Lawrence: “To listen 
to the discourse on No Child Left Behind is to hear a story of failing 
schools without a history—a history of segregation, of inadequate funding, 
of white flight, of neglect, of eyes averted and uncaring while the savage 
inequalities of American education grew ever wider.”141 The reworked justi-
fication for NCLBA erases history while relying on the modern myth of 
formal racial equality.142  Formal racial equality is narrative conveyed by 
federal courts.143  In this narrative, school districts are confirmed as unitary 
under the Equal Protection Clause, despite the fact that black children go to 
schools without any white classmate; that they are institutions of learning 
where inequality does not exist, even though some children of color con-
tinue to attend schools with toilets that do not work and leaky roofs as other 
students study on campuses furnished with state-of-the-art science labs and 
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Olympic-sized swimming pools.  In reality, racially and economically seg-
regated suburbs exist as havens for white flight without any legal or consti-
tutional liability for the segregation staying alive in either the suburban 
schools or the inner city schools attended by their not-so-distant neigh-
bors.144  NCLBA made use of Marion Wright Edleman’s Children’s Defense 
Fund call for Americans to come together and ‘Leave No Child Behind’ in 
adopting its name.145  Professor Lawrence maintained that the Bush Ad-
ministration has used the NCLBA to lay claims as champions of poor black 
children without honoring its duty to articulate the role that America has 
played in the oppression of a black child’s right to educational equity.146   
   In Tuscaloosa, Alabama, many black parents energetically reject a re-
zoning plan that required black students to transfer to low-performing 
schools.147  Said Kendra Williams, a hospital receptionist whose two chil-
dren were rezoned: “We’re talking about moving children from good 
schools into low-performing ones, and that’s illegal.  It’s all about race.  It’s 
as clear as daylight.”148  Some key Tuscaloosa school officials defend the 
rezoning plan as a proper response to claims of overcrowded schools.149  
Although school board members stated that the rezoning plan was not based 
on race, black members of the town believed that the plan was another at-
tempt to return to separate-but-equal practice in education.150   
One issue for consideration under the NCLBA is whether a school re-
zoning plan can be defeated by construing the NCLBA as prohibiting 
school officials from moving minority students into low-performing 
schools.151  When the rezoning matter was challenged in Alabama, the Ala-
bama state superintendent concluded that the rezoning plan did not violate 
federal law.152  The Alabama state superintendent concluded African-
American students could be transferred from a high-performing school to a 
lower performing minority school without violating NCLBA as long as the 
transferred African-American student had a right to retransfer back to the 
better schools under NCLBA.153  Many black parents believed that it is an 
arbitrary use of power that defies the purpose of the NCLBA to allow 
school officials to use school zoning laws to ship African-American stu-
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dents away from high-performing, racially integrated schools to low-
performing, racially identifiable schools.  Black parents in Tuscaloosa, Ala-
bama, as well as other southern communities in Florida, Tennessee, and 
North Carolina, are attempting to use the NCLBA to assure that African-
American children are not routinely assigned into those schools that have a 
reputation for being academically unsuccessful.154      
Professor Lawrence fears that the NCLBA and formal-equality ration-
ale may cause African Americans and others to forget that the continuing 
existence of racial inequality in education has not been realized in Tusca-
loosa, Alabama.155 The debate about NCLBA benefits and faults, and lack 
of historical context did not cause supporters of educational equity in Tus-
caloosa to “forget the deep structures of inequality that remain in place.”156  
In fact, parents in Tuscaloosa hope to use the NCLBA to breathe new life 
into Brown v. Board of Education, and to fight a segregation system de-
signed to oppress children by teaching them that they are inferior because 
of the color of their skin.157  Professor Lawrence concluded: “We are segre-
gated still, by race and by class, and segregation still achieves its purposes 
well. Can No Child Left Behind claim to be about equality without disman-
tling segregation, a system designed for inequality?  I think not.  But that is 
exactly the claim it makes.”158  Daniel J. Losen, a Legal and Policy research 
associate with The Civil Rights Project (CRP) at Harvard University, as-
serted that “[o]ne new step toward fulfilling Brown’s promise might be 
found in the principle of race-conscious accountability embedded within the 
[NCLBA].”159  The race-based accountability rationale advanced by the 
NCLBA may well provide an extraordinary array of novel tools for civil 
rights advocates seeking equity in education.160  Title I of NCLBA makes 
available the biggest separate source of federal education funding directed 
at assisting states in addressing the educational requirements that socio-
economically disadvantaged students must meet.161  Every state must use 
Title I funds to enhance its own educational spending and is barred from 
using federal money to replace its expenditures.162  Practically, each school 
district in the United States collects some of the roughly $10 billion appro-
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priated annually.163  To accomplish its objective, Title I also includes a vari-
ety of monitoring and enforcement constraints that place conditions on 
spending by the state, district, and school.164  
While approving NCLBA, Congress explicitly added race-conscious 
accountability standards to Title I in an effort to equalize the terrible racial 
disparities in educational success between whites and other racial groups.165  
The goal of the NCLBA contains the next statement, “[c]losing the 
achievement gap between high and low-performing children, especially the 
achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between 
disadvantaged and their more advantaged peers. . . .”166  NCLBA provides a 
different accountability system which embraces technical assistance,167 
along with progressively more severe sanctions at the school and district 
level.168  The main goal of NCLBA is to advance the academic skills and 
aptitude of all students by means of subgroup accountability to prohibit 
school officials from ignoring racial disparities in achievement by not dis-
closing the subgroup achievement gap when the data is analyzed in the ag-
gregate.169  Under the NCLBA, the constant failure of any focal, racial, or 
ethnic group and of socioeconomically disadvantaged students at the school 
or district level is capable of initiating an intervention that could lead to 
sanctions.170  Notwithstanding significant shortcomings with its execu-
tion,171 and what scores of educators maintain is an inappropriately test-
driven accountability plan,172 Title I’s changed accountability scheme on the 
whole is one of the most race-conscious legislative remedies to address  
racial inequity in K-12 education ever since Congress passed Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI).173  
Even if No Child Left Behind was not intended to affirmatively dis-
mantle racial segregation, I think it offends the goal and purpose of the 
NCLBA to allow public school officials to remove a black student from a 
high-performing school with racial diversity and send that student to a low- 
performing school that is virtually all black.  Supporters of educational eq-
uity in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, may find it useful to follow Losen’s advice 
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and engage in a campaign to raise awareness that the NCLBA has “several 
race-conscious accountability provisions and requirements” that should 
prevent school officials from transferring black students out of a high-
performing integrated school to a low-performing school with a majority of 
black students in order to increase the percentage of white students attend-
ing the high performing integrated school.174  “Although the accountability 
approach as represented by the NCLBA is far from ideal, the race-conscious 
accountability requirements increase the chance that racial disparities will 
be reported and discussed publicly.  Despite the problems, the new principle 
that all should take responsibility for tackling unacceptable and inadequate 
achievement outcomes for every major racial and ethnic group is funda-
mentally sound and potentially transformative.”175  Race-conscious ac-
countability provisions are permissible only to achieve the race neutral ob-
jective of excellence in education for all students regardless of either race or 
class. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The NCLBA places a constitutionally impermissible regulatory-
funding burden on states and schools systems.  Spending Clause regulation 
of state school educational systems violates a state’s right to control its own 
local educational policy as authorized by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  However, a state is not free to adopt local educational polices 
that violate one’s right to be free of racial discrimination under the equal-
protection-of-law concept.  Those underfunded, highly regulatory provi-
sions of the NCLBA should rightfully be regarded by the courts as the gov-
ernment’s exercise of power in violation of the Spending Clause.  If Con-
gress were ever to adequately fund the NCLBA, “the overarching question 
is whether the race-conscious accountability approach in NCLB provides 
any useful tools for advocates seeking racial justice.”176  I believe that a 
properly funded and properly implemented NCLBA may be used as a tool 
to promote racial justice in education.   
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